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The Dutch Connection: The European Court of Human Rights 
and the Pursuit of Global Citizenship in the Netherlands 
 
Patrick Schmidt and Erik Larson 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
For centuries, the Netherlands, seen by many as an island of toleration and liberal values, 
has drawn those escaping intolerance and repression. It remains as attractive a destination 
today as it was (at least initially) for the Puritans fleeing England. Recognizing the 
differences among nations, the abiding questions of political life search for normative 
prescriptions: What obligations do governments have toward individuals and what 
limitations to their authority must governments observe? The idiosyncrasies of the Dutch 
case provide well-trodden ground for the study of civil liberties and rights, most famously 
the libertarian approaches to drugs and prostitution. However, those arrangements, 
inflected with a voyeurism for cultural understandings of deviance, tell us relatively little 
about the most important development in the debate about government over the past 
century, namely, the problem that any attempt to answer fundamental political questions 
cannot reside solely within the Netherlands or the boundaries of any nation, but is shared 
across national boundaries in the search for unifying values and settlements. 
   This article explores how the quest for global citizenship occurs in the dialogue 
between the European Court of Human Rights—the most important locus of European 
dialogue on the obligations of states—and the Netherlands, considered by many (and 
many Dutch especially) as one of the exemplars of just government. We consider the 
position of the Netherlands in implementing European human rights norms as a probing 
example of the outer limits of a global human rights vision. In particular, we focus not on 
the traditional core of civil liberties and rights, such as religion and speech, but on one of 
the most vital areas of contemporary human rights law to a world marked by the 
transformations of globalization: immigration, which includes those seeking asylum from 
inhuman treatment and the unification of families across national borders. In a climate 
still clouded by prejudice and fear, and with resistance to the religious, ethnic, and racial 
diversity that immigrants bring, what is the potential for human rights to unite nations 
around core values, to make global citizens out of both immigrants and host nations? 
   The first section of this article sets the stage by outlining a conceptual framework 
containing our assumptions about the nature of the problem. We follow with a section 
sketching the development of human rights dialogue and institutions for Europe, which 
illustrates how the nation-state framework has been stretched by the rise of a new sphere 
of actors and influences. In the third section, the discussion turns to individual cases that 
demonstrate how the European Court of Human Rights has grown as a regulator of state 
policy, which brings specificity to the kinds of dialogues that remain, even for those 
choosing the Netherlands as the place to vindicate their claims as asylum seekers and 
immigrants. Finally, we discuss the implications of these jurisprudential developments 
for the state, politics, and human rights. We argue, ultimately, that while the Court as a 
human rights institution has increased its authority over member states (vis-à-vis popular 
sovereignty), its reliance on states to implement its decisions, along with the ability of 
states to avoid the judgments in particular cases, serves to refract and limit the effective 
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autonomy of the Court. Nevertheless, lawyers and civil servants as professionals 
operating in both the domestic and international areas have become vital actors, setting 
the agenda and shaping the inputs that give the Court the possibility of rendering 
judgments. 
 
II.  Global Citizenship and Human Rights 
 
For much of the modern era, the concept of citizenship framed the answers to these most 
fundamental questions. Nation-states retained sovereignty for domestic affairs and a 
state’s citizens had a particular set of claims against that state. Citizenship and 
governance were inextricably linked, and the rights of citizens and obligations of 
government followed. Throughout European history, both the breadth and depth of 
citizenship rights expanded. Initial civil rights merely limiting governmental authority 
provided a foundation for positive rights to political participation and social welfare 
provision, and the range of people holding rights expanded to include groups that had 
previously been considered non-citizens or subsidiaries in households.1 
   Against this backdrop, the concept of “global citizenship” appears as a puzzle. What 
makes it both “global” and “citizenship”? One could answer this challenge in two simple, 
incorrect ways—but ones that point to elements of a better answer. First, one could 
simply dismiss the notion of global citizenship as oxymoronic. From this perspective, 
since there is no true world government in which individuals participate, there is no 
citizenry. Furthermore, since there is no distinction between citizens and non-citizens, the 
concept becomes meaningless. This perspective maintains the idea that citizenship is 
strictly an individual attribute that comes about from relations between a person and a 
particular state. Claims of citizenship, however, have transcended borders (viz., both 
expatriates and dual citizens). Additionally, international and global norms about proper 
relations between states and citizens remain powerful cultural forces in the contemporary 
world. The element of truth to this first perspective is that individual belonging to a 
global order often happens through specific states; that is, individual experiences of 
citizenship will be grounded in relation to particular governments. 
   A second flawed answer might be to dismiss the significance of citizenship per se, such 
that “global citizenship” is possible only in an era in which national citizenship has 
become hollow due to the declining power of the state. From this perspective, as 
governments face an increasingly powerful global market, their room for maneuver 
shrinks. At the same time, old notions of racial and national difference have declined. 
From this perspective, global citizenship becomes the new imperative and possibility for 
democratic governance, since governance needs to extend beyond the borders of any 
particular country and to involve some degree of equal participation in social and 
political life. Given continuing patterns of migration and debates about the status of 
migrants, however, this perspective does not describe global citizenship as an emergent 
practice, but as a political goal and an individual ideal: each person should strive to 
uphold the admonitions of buttons and bumper stickers (living simply so others can live, 
thinking globally and acting locally). 
   In many respects, these two attempts to understand global citizenship share the 
foundational idea that there is a limited practice of global citizenship. We approach the 
question of what constitutes global citizenship from a different perspective. Citizenship—
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as a practice of defining the relationship between individuals and the authority embodied 
in nation-states—has become global due to the expansion of the nation-state system. 
From this perspective, citizenship as a set of claims that one has against a government has 
become global in three distinct ways: 
 
1. The range of claims one can make has increasingly converged across states. The 
rights of citizens increasingly look alike, whether considered as constitutional 
protections, criminal laws, or human rights (the latter of which has the most 
universal form in the statement of the claim); 
 
2. Rights claims have become denationalized. Individuals no longer legitimately 
claim rights as members of ethno-national groups, but make claims against 
particular governments to whose authority they are subject;2 
 
3. Claims have become deterritorialized. Governments have obligations to people 
who are outside their borders and who are not expatriates. Perhaps the clearest 
example of this obligation is toward asylum-seekers. 
 
   We take this perspective with the assumption that nation-states do not possess the 
sovereignty to define actions independently; rather, nation-states are highly structured 
organizations in a complex environment, leading them to be subject to normative and 
coercive pressures.3 From this perspective, then, global citizenship is as much about the 
regulation of states and the use of state authority as it is about the forces that encourage, 
persuade, or coerce state action, and in particular human rights. Human rights serve as a 
passive measure of the actions of states and a reference point in normative discussions. 
   As a particular form of the manifestation of global citizenship, “human rights” produces 
similar puzzles formed of the two-word concept. The assertion that a human right must 
be respected invites the assumption that this must be a universal attribute of humanity. 
Human rights coincide with a global and international vision, but reside in local actions. 
The assertion that it is a right invites the assumption that it is enacted constitutionally or 
legally, which means that the legal institutions that have primary enforcement authority at 
the “street-level” must be called into service.4 Since the state is both the object of 
regulation and the site through which individuals make claims, we anticipate that political 
contention will influence the actual practice of rights. The influence includes both 
agenda-setting and refraction of international-global norms and ideas. Agenda-setting 
asks who is involved in bringing in the global ideas and how. Refraction examines how 
the bureaucratic and democratic structures influence the reception of global imperatives.5 
   Europe, the site of so much human tragedy as well as the source of a great proportion of 
the animating spirit behind the human rights regime of the last century, is “ground zero” 
for this inquiry. In Europe, there has been a sea change in thinking about international 
collaboration in the production of a shared order. It is the home to a surfeit of institutions 
and plays a leadership role in many others, such as the European Court of Justice, 
European Court of Human Rights, International Criminal Court, and International Court 
of Justice. These governance institutions now make claims to authority over national 
sovereignty. While there is a deep sense of fascination with—and indeed “buy-in” to—
the project, the implementation of European mandates relies on national authorities 
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complying with directives and judgments. Decisions about compliance and the national 
debates they inspire influence the constitution of political communities. We therefore 
attend to concerns about the meaning of human rights in practice and the impact of this 
practice on a European society that contains cleavages that are more or less salient and 
powerful as divisors, offering both forces of change and resistance. This analysis helps us 
to understand how global citizenship and human rights affect the interplay of nation-
states and individuals in the contemporary era. 
 
III.  Human Rights and Europe 
 
The codification of human rights in formal international institutions has had a powerful 
effect on political imagination, providing an important telos, or objective, that overlaps 
with but also stands separate from more parochial platforms of political and social 
reform. At the inception of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the human rights 
agenda was inspired by the unparalleled horror of two world wars and the Holocaust. The 
first item on the human rights agenda was to institutionalize the promise of “never 
again,” and the international community was supported in its confidence by its collective 
sense that a right to be free of genocide truly was shared universally. 
   The classic epistemological problem left to scholars by the diplomats was the 
derivation of those rights and calls for recognition of additional human rights. The idea of 
truly universal and actionable rights found inordinate objections, including from a Europe 
experiencing a broad secularization in the decades that followed. If not an equality before 
the eyes of one Judeo-Christian God, the work of humanists, anthropologists, and sundry 
others was no more likely to find a thick account of universality, especially one strong 
enough to ground social rights (such as a right to housing) as well as a full complement 
of criminal rights (such as a right to a trial by jury). Nevertheless, many pages of 
academic journals have been consumed with the debates between the “universalist” and 
“relativist” camps. 
   As discussed by Dianna Shandy and Marlies Glasius in this volume, the conceptual 
problems have not prevented the emergence of a series of international criminal juridical 
bodies with jurisdiction over “crimes against humanity,” modeled after the Nuremburg 
trials.6 In practice, human rights judicial institutions typically are organized on a regional 
basis, perhaps reflecting a pragmatic orientation. To develop a wider set of human rights 
principles and precedents, a possible solution to the problem is to narrow the ambition. 
Instead of finding global human rights, we could build shared commitments among the 
community of European (or American or Asian) states, where foundational similarities in 
political systems and traditions might allow the harmonization of views on the 
constitutional question of rights. 
   This observation about the formation of a community begs a question that needs 
clarification: what is Europe? Most familiar is the European Economic Community 
created in the 1950s initially as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), later 
becoming the European Union, and even more specifically, the European Monetary 
Union with the Euro currency. These institutions began with quite limited ambitions—the 
emphasis has been on markets, trade, and regulation in matters of cross-border need—and 
membership. Many “European” countries (such as the U.K. and Sweden) remain outside 
the currency, and the expansion of EU membership to Eastern European countries has 
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been deliberate and the source of much disagreement. As an institution of the European 
Union, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), established as part of the ECSC treaty, has 
the central purpose of ensuring consistent application and interpretation of European law. 
The ECJ has been an important vehicle for national-level interest groups to mobilize 
toward the goal of altering national policymaking, and it has also helped to connect 
similar interest groups across national lines.7 
   Curiously, given how little agreement can be found even in matters of shared economic 
interests, the membership of the evolving schemes for European human rights is much 
wider.  The Council of Europe in Strasbourg, under a separate treaty structure, is more 
flexible in its definition of “Europe” and is thus more ambitious in scope, at least 
geographically. Its most well-known institution, the European Court of Human Rights 
(the ECHR), takes in 47 member countries stretching as far east as Russia. With the 
exception of Belarus, the Council includes all members of the former Soviet bloc west of 
the Caspian Sea, and stretches south, through Azerbaijan, to Turkey. The ECHR traces its 
roots to the [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (the Convention), which was completed in 1950. Although established by the 
Convention, the ECHR started operations in 1959 and has experienced considerable 
change, becoming a full-time court only in 1998. The ECHR has 47 judges, one for each 
state party. Seated in Strasbourg, it hears cases before seven-judge Chambers with the 
possibility of a Grand Chamber of 17 judges hearing or re-hearing a case under appeal 
(referral) in exceptional circumstances.8 
   The ECHR may appear to an outsider as a European analog to the United States 
Supreme Court; however, the ECHR technically does not sit as an appellate court. 
Complaints are brought to the court as suits by aggrieved individuals, and the review is 
de novo, meaning the examination begins again into the whole record. Further, the ECHR 
works in one direction only: it either helps the individual or does nothing in that case. 
The docket thus has a built-in bias for ECHR judges, meaning that they hear nothing but 
complaints about the abuse of human rights by national actors. In the U.S. system, by 
comparison, the losing party may appeal to the Supreme Court, meaning that its justices 
hear the claims of complaints of governments as well as individuals. Whether due to this 
factor or others, by repute the “Strasbourg culture” leans strongly to the protection of 
individual rights, sustaining itself as the many judges come and go. Indeed, the number of 
complaints filed before the ECHR has increased markedly since the 1998 reform, and a 
significant animating question of the past decade has focused on the efficiency and 
fairness of the Court’s procedures for processing the thousands of cases filed each year—
along with a total backlog of cases that in recent years has reached six digits. In the long 
perspective, the ECHR has become a vital institution for Europe, one that has centered 
the discourse of post-WWII Europe on rights. As Alec Stone Sweet and Helen Keller 
summarized, “The ECHR has evolved into a sophisticated legal system whose Court can 
be expected to exercise substantial influence on the national legal systems of its 
members. In the 21st Century, Europe is a Europe of rights.”9 
   Given the wide and voluminous base of participation in the European human rights 
project, skepticism about the potential for common agreement on the content of those 
rights remains. How can a convention stretching across 47 countries, from Iceland to 
Azerbaijan, find meaning without either hollowing out the content of the universal 
declarations or facing substantial noncompliance with judicial decrees? Both possibilities 
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call into question the legitimacy of the institutions of the Convention, especially the 
behavior of the judges and ECHR collectively. 
   Yet, it is important from the perspective of the United States to appreciate that even 
with centuries of maturity, a meaningful constitution of rights does not depend on a thick 
notion of standardization. Put another way, the U.S. demonstrates that regional variation 
is not inconsistent with a rights regime—indeed, regional flexibility may assist the 
development and entrenchment of rights. Civil liberties in the U.S. are interpreted with a 
complicated relationship between universalism and community. There is a general 
universalism assumed in the Declaration of Independence, though it is simultaneously 
covered by a “social contract” philosophy that links rights with the community in a sort 
of constitutional congregationalism. The “priests” of the Supreme Court, in the 20th 
century, moved with legal realism to a view of constitutional interpretation that makes 
social transformation (chronological change) an acceptable reason for constitutional 
reinterpretation. In a common law legal tradition that leaves the constitutional text intact, 
this tradition means that there is no “thick” theory of universalism for human rights in the 
U.S. system. The leading edge of conflict concerns differing understandings allowed by 
the scale of the American political community and the range of diversity required by 
federalism. Thus, the Supreme Court has been opportunistic in accepting local 
“community norms” into its prescriptions for the meaning of constitutional text, perhaps 
no more explicitly than in defining the permissible limits of obscenity regulations under 
the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech and press. 
   The question of what constitutes community has renewed salience in many European 
countries, including the Netherlands. If the growth of European-wide governance raises 
the question of what Europe is, then the movement of peoples within and across putative 
regional boundaries puts the significance of that question into sharp relief. A simple stroll 
along the streets of The Hague alone makes clear just how diverse Dutch civil and 
political society has become. Whether in the restaurants, stores, mosques, or the faces of 
those lining up to vote in the June 9, 2010, Dutch elections, the apparent racial, ethnic, 
and religious diversity has put on the political and legal agenda the question of 
membership in the national and continental system. Some of the New Dutch emanate 
from the geographic fringes of the continent, including Turkey and Russia, while others 
arrived in Europe from the Global South. 
   The category of New Dutch from the Global South includes both people from former 
colonies and those who arrived in Europe without that historic tie to their new home. The 
Netherlands, like France, the United Kingdom, and other European powers, faces the 
question of the government’s responsibility toward former colonial subjects from 
Indonesia, the Antilles, and Suriname. The Netherlands is an ideal case for studying its 
understanding and response to emerging human rights ideas because of its relationship to 
the second sub-category, non-colonial immigration. Colonial subjects might, in some 
sense, be regarded as the “legacy” duty of the state. Examining non-colonial subjects 
seeking entry into Holland isolates a separate vein, especially given the historic 
commitment of the Dutch to toleration and openness. In short, as the seat of international 
justice institutions, and with a cultural heritage that valorizes success in treating 
judiciously those who seek the respect of human rights conventions, the Netherlands 
serves in many respects as a paradigmatic case for assessing how far human rights works 
as a normative tool toward convergence within Europe. 
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   In the next section we examine select conflicts that have reached the ECHR on issues of 
the entry of individuals. We focus on the legal engagement of human rights in the area of 
immigration and asylum as a case study of the law’s encounter with significant, long-
term changes in demographics and national identity. Our analysis draws on published 
ECHR decisions concerning the Netherlands and interviews we conducted with 
practitioners in the Netherlands. The starting point for that analysis is the political 
dynamic that has made immigration a highly salient question, a potential backlash and a 
consideration of the Dutch government when it confronts the nature and limits of its 
relationships to the individual.    
 
IV.  Foreign Nationals, the Netherlands, and the ECHR 
 
During the last decade, immigration and asylum have figured prominently in the political 
debate in the Netherlands. The results of the 2010 elections, in which the far-right Party 
for Freedom (PVV), headed by the colorful Geert Wilders, won the opportunity to play a 
significant role in the resulting coalition government, are not a part a momentary swing in 
national views. Instead, they are the result of a decade-long conversation in which the 
role of Muslims (and to a lesser extent other minorities) came to dominate the agenda. 
Wilders’ rise to prominence built on the popularity of fellow far-right populist Pim 
Fortuyn, who was assassinated in 2002. Both Wilders and Fortuyn have played upon 
resentment, sometimes linked to concerns about crime, but ironically they have linked 
Muslims to the loss of human rights (i.e., the claimed compulsory wearing of the veil by 
women and fears about the intolerance of Islam generally and toward gay rights in 
particular) as an argument for a wider concern about Islam. As a result, Dutch policy in 
both immigration and asylum has become significantly more restrictive. For example, the 
Netherlands instituted new requirements for prospective immigrants to demonstrate an 
understanding of Dutch language and political culture. The Netherlands has also 
established new detention centers for asylum seekers during the period in which their 
case is pending. Further, the government has enacted regulations and laws making it 
easier to expel migrants and asylees. 
   Against this backdrop, a number of current or potential migrants and asylees have filed 
grievances against the Netherlands in the European Court of Human Rights. Only a small 
minority of these grievances result in published decisions; however, one published 
decision of the Court may cover issues related to a large number of cases. The published 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in two sets of issues—asylum (based 
on Article 3 of the Convention) and family reunification (based on Article 8)—provide a 
small but interesting window into the Dutch dynamics of human rights. Of more than 
6,000 applications filed against the Netherlands in Strasbourg between 1983 and 2006, 
just 123 produced decisions on their merits; Articles 3 and 8 have accounted for over 
10% of these decisions.10 
 
A.  Article 3: Asylum  
 
If one sees human rights as imposing a duty on all governments to protect the human 
rights of all people, not just citizens, one of the most pressing areas of human rights law 
must be asylum. The Court’s asylum cases usually concern Article 3 of the Convention, 
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which reads, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment.” While there is no inherent right in the Convention to political asylum 
and states retain the right to expel non-citizens, individuals whom states seek to expel 
may have a claim against the state if the expulsion would result in a real risk of facing 
inhuman, degrading treatment or torture. To determine whether an expulsion would 
violate Article 3, the ECHR undertakes a full assessment of the situation the individual 
would be likely to face in the receiving country at the time of the expulsion. To make this 
assessment, the court draws on material from the state and “other reliable and objective 
sources” (Salah Sheekh, para. 136) to determine if the individual would be likely to face 
ill treatment contrary to Article 3. 
   In Salah Sheekh v. The Netherlands,11 a case involving a Somali man requesting 
asylum, the Court held that the Netherlands had violated Article 3 by attempting to return 
Abdirizaq Salah Sheekh, a member of the Ashraf minority, to certain parts of Somalia 
after a failed asylum application. Salah Sheekh’s family fled Mogadishu when he was 
five. The family relocated to a village in which they were persecuted due to their minority 
status and the fact that they received no protection from local clans. When Salah Sheekh 
was nine, a local militia killed his father. The local militia continued to mete out 
harassment, intimidation, and physical violence toward Salah Sheekh and his family, 
killing an older brother and raping a sister when Salah Sheekh was in his mid-teens. His 
family finally was able to arrange for Salah Sheekh to flee Somalia when a relative 
negotiated compensation for the family from the people who took over the family house 
in Mogadishu. Using the services of an agent who arranged false passports and transport, 
Salah Sheekh flew to Nairobi, Istanbul, and then Amsterdam. 
   On arrival in Amsterdam, Salah Sheekh requested asylum and was brought to the 
application center, where he was interviewed during the next two days. The Ministry of 
Immigration and Integration then held him in detention during the next month as it 
continued to interview and examine Salah Sheekh about his background and reasons for 
seeking asylum. Slightly over a month after his arrival in the Netherlands, the Minister of 
Immigration and Integration denied Salah Sheekh’s request, holding that he had not been 
specifically targeted as a member of an opposition group or movement but that he had 
experienced the occasional effects of an unstable situation. The Minister planned to 
return Salah Sheekh to a “relatively safe” area in Somalia, and during the next six months 
Dutch courts upheld this plan six times over Sheekh’s appeals. Rather than appeal to the 
Administrative Jurisdiction Division (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak) of the Council of 
State (Raad van State), Salah Sheekh filed a case with the European Court of Human 
Rights. The Grand Chamber of the Court informed the Netherlands that it was in the best 
interest of justice not to expel Salah Sheekh prior to hearing the case. During the ensuing 
period, the Minister released Salah Sheekh from detention and adopted a temporary 
policy under which he was eligible for a residence permit. 
   Relying on information from a variety of sources (including the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, BBC, Médecins Sans Frontières, and Amnesty 
International), the Court held that expulsion to the “relatively safe” areas of Somalia 
would likely result in Salah Sheekh suffering treatment contrary to the stipulations of 
Article 3. Since he was a member of a minority group, Salah Sheekh would not receive 
protection from local clans and, as a result, would be forced into an internally displaced 
persons camp, where he would be vulnerable to further victimization. As is characteristic 
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of the ECHR’s approach, the decision under Article 3 held only that the Netherlands 
could not expel Salah Sheekh; the decision did not hold that the Netherlands should grant 
Salah Sheekh refugee status and a residence permit. In practice, of course, the ECHR’s 
decision has a determined effect without being explicit. Since the decision held that 
return to any part of Somalia would have resulted in Salah Sheekh suffering inhuman or 
degrading treatment, the policy of the Netherlands became to offer people in such 
situations asylum. As a result of the decision, Salah Sheekh—and hundreds of other 
Somalis in the Netherlands from similar backgrounds—had a more permanent basis to 
reside in the Netherlands on asylum.12 Nevertheless, such decisions have immediate 
effects on the national government, since it needs to develop a plan for complying with 
the court’s order. In the Netherlands, coordination meetings between various ministries 
that included both civil servants and political officials had to decide on a course of 
compliance. 
   Salah Sheekh speaks to an immediate controversy and the effective meaning of human 
rights, but the dialogue between the nation-state and the Court speaks to the wider 
question about how multiple centers of political gravity interact. Decisions under Article 
3 are, in concept, all-or-nothing: if it applies to a case, it is absolute. However, scope for 
disagreement occurs in the judgment of whether a person runs a real risk of undergoing 
inhuman or degrading treatment upon return. What is a real risk, and how far is it 
foreseeable? “The absoluteness” of Article 3, “isn’t that absolute, if you know these 
criteria,” an official in the Dutch government offered as an explanation. The politics of 
human rights jurisprudence is the level of deference in the interplay between ECHR and 
national authorities. Indeed, the case drew even more attention for the fact that the Court 
issued the decision without Salah Sheekh pursuing an appeal with the Administrative 
Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State. The Court may only hear cases if applicants 
have exhausted domestic remedies. In its decision, the Court explained that, “the 
obligation to exhaust domestic remedies is, however, limited to making use of those 
remedies which are likely to be effective and available in that their existence is 
sufficiently certain and they are capable of redressing directly the alleged violation of the 
Convention” (para. 121). The Court concluded that for Salah Sheekh, “a further appeal 
would have had virtually no prospect of success” (para. 123). The ECHR pointed to the 
fact that the Administrative Jurisdiction Division had recently issued a decision in a 
similar case that an individual seeking asylum would need to show the he was 
individually targeted and that the deprivations were more severe than for other members 
of the same ethnic group. 
   The ECHR’s past decisions on when domestic remedies have been exhausted are 
“fraught with factual and political complexity.”13 In providing the underlying logic of the 
provision requiring “exhaustion of domestic remedies,” the Court explicated that its 
primary goal is regulation of state behavior. “The purpose…is to afford the Contracting 
States the opportunity of preventing or putting right the violations alleged against them 
before those allegations are submitted to the Court” (para. 121). In this respect, the Court 
serves not as a court of appeal, but as a forum to judge state policies and, if necessary, 
highlight the need for corrective action. But the willingness to take on the case without 
the formal completion of appeals—signaling, perhaps, a sense of having given up on 
getting the outcome it seeks from national authorities—requires a growing confidence in 
the institution’s authority to speak for the individual. Some commentators have suggested 
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that Salah Sheekh appropriately flagged the lack of care given to expulsion decisions by 
the Council of State.14 One government lawyer we interviewed acknowledged this 
development, even if he ultimately was not keen on it. “The court has said that national 
authorities are best placed to assess [the risks of returning an asylum seeker],” he intoned. 
“Normally they would not call that into question, but more and more we see that they do 
it. We’re not happy with how far the Court goes in that, in part because it creates an 
enormous amount of work….” Dutch authorities have seen a similar willingness of the 
Court to intervene in other areas of policy, such as determining when the government 
may rely on anonymous witnesses for criminal prosecution. Through its decisions both to 
take a case and to issue a judgment, the Court invites reform. The response of the nation-
state, even if not directly commanded, can become part of the evolving norms for other 
countries. One interviewee in the Dutch government pointed to areas of law where they 
find themselves communicating to other Council of Europe countries about the types of 
policy steps taken in response to the Court, thus forming the norms of human rights 
through evolutionary adaptation. These norms then may feed back into the Court’s 
decision making in similar cases. 
 
B.  Article 8: Family Life  
 
In a longer historical perspective, there might be no surprise if the Netherlands were 
among the European leaders in welcoming asylum seekers to residence and citizenship. 
The ECHR’s regulation of state actions in this area would be conducted by and through 
the work of nation-states in reaching toward norms to govern all countries. Yet recent 
years have also pointed to the possibilities of resistance to human rights. One of the most 
active areas for this discussion concerns Article 8 of the Convention, for which the 
Netherlands has been the subject of a significant number of published opinions. 
 
Article 8 
 
Right to respect for private and family life 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home, 
and his correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as in accordance with law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health. 
 
   In relation to immigration, Article 8 cases typically involve claims by individuals that 
they should be able to be in the country to be with family members (typically, partners or 
children). Article 8 regulates state actions in its second paragraph; however, it allows that 
a state may interfere with the right to private and family life when it follows a formal 
legal procedure and when interference is “necessary in a democratic society” for one of 
the many purposes of government. 
   Legally, Article 8 is very different from Article 3. This allowance for state interference 
gives exceptions for when the right supersedes state action. Under Article 3, the formal 
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questions of judgment lay only in the sufficiency of evidence; once the risk to the asylee 
has been established, the state’s duty is implicit but unqualified. Article 8’s exceptions 
impose a substantive balancing of values and question much more sharply the role of the 
nation-state in making those decisions in light of national values and traditions. In Article 
8 cases, the Court first determines whether any interference with private and family life 
has occurred. If so, then the Court examines whether this interference followed the law of 
the country and whether the interference promoted a national interest. If there was an 
interference under a law that promoted a national interest, the Court finally weighs the 
relative collective interests against the individual interests in private and family life. 
   As suggested previously, the public debate in the Netherlands makes this dialogue 
politically salient. The Article 8 obligations of states extend to non-citizens (as the first 
paragraph applies to “everyone,” not merely citizens). For migrants, these obligations can 
be positive (the state has the obligation to admit a migrant) as well as negative (the state 
must refrain from expelling a foreign national). An imposition of a positive obligation 
could be received very poorly, seen as outside interference in an area of pressing public 
need. Thus, the Court has developed a doctrinal device, or a turn of phrase, meant to 
capture the relationship of national and universal authority—giving a “margin of 
appreciation” for states’ needs—with the scope wider in the case of positive 
obligations.15 
   Decisions in Article 8 cases concerning the Netherlands during the past two decades 
suggest that the Court has increased the weight it gives to family rights, which is to say 
that it has narrowed the Margin of Appreciation given to states’ interests in denying entry 
to family members. This kind of balancing may not be particularly amenable to detailed 
analysis; whether that is correct, the Court seldom elaborates much on the necessity of 
the state’s actions. Rather, the Court tends either to accept the state’s claims as necessary 
or reject the state’s unwarranted interference with or deprivation of family rights. The 
relative weight of individual and collective interests ties closely to the question of 
deference to state’s decisions. 
   Two Dutch cases illustrate the ECHR’s increasingly heavier weighting of family rights. 
Both Ahmut v. The Netherlands16 and Şen v. The Netherlands (2001)17 concerned an 
immigrant parent who had petitioned the Netherlands to grant a residence permit to a 
child left behind in the country of origin. In both cases, the Court considered whether the 
Netherlands had a positive obligation to issue residence permits to children. In Ahmut, by 
a five-to-four decision the Court found that the Netherlands had not violated Article 8. In 
Şen, a unanimous Court found an Article 8 violation. 
   The facts of the two cases pose a number of similarities, a fact not lost upon the Court. 
Ahmut concerned nine-year old Souffiane Ahmut, the youngest child from Salah Ahmut’s 
first marriage in Morocco. After ending this marriage, Salah migrated to the Netherlands 
in 1986, when he married a Dutch national. Salah was granted citizenship in 1990 and 
held dual Dutch and Moroccan nationality. In 1987, Souffiane’s mother died in a traffic 
accident, leaving Salah as the legal guardian of his children in Morocco, though initially 
he arranged for relatives to care for them. Salah and his second wife separated in 
February 1990 and divorced in December of that year. That same year, Souffiane and a 
sister came to the Netherlands without a residential visa. Salah enrolled Souffiane in a 
primary school and applied for a residence permit for him, which was rejected by the 
181 
 
Deputy Minister of Justice on the grounds that family ties between Souffiane and Salah 
had been broken years earlier. 
   The later of the two cases concerned nine-year-old Sinem Şen, whose parents married 
in Turkey in 1980. Her father, Zeki, a Turkish national, had been resident in the 
Netherlands since 1977, where he returned after the marriage. Her mother, Gülden, 
remained in Turkey, where she gave birth to Sinem in 1983. Leaving Sinem in the care of 
her aunt, Gülden joined Zeki in the Netherlands in 1986, where they had two more 
children. In 1992, Zeki applied for a residence permit for Sinem. Dutch officials did not 
grant the permit since they held that Sinem was no longer part of Zeki and Gülden’s 
family, but part of her aunt’s family. 
   The difference in results in the two cases from the ECHR is striking, as illustrated by a 
comparison of subtle factual details. In Ahmut, the Court held that Salah had chosen to 
migrate to the Netherlands and that, if he had wanted to have a familial relationship with 
his son, he could have done so in Morocco, since he retained dual nationality. 
Accordingly, since the Netherlands had a legitimate state interest in controlling 
immigration to protect the labor market, the slight interference in family life did not rise 
to a violation of Article 8. Among the dissents, most notable was Dutch Judge S. K. 
Martens’ criticism that the Court had abdicated its responsibility to oversee states’ 
immigration policies: “[T]he present decision marks a growing tendency to relax control, 
if not an increasing preparedness to condone harsh decisions, in the field of immigration” 
(para. 2). Martens appealed to the Court to respect the desire of Salah, with his dual 
nationality, to choose the Netherlands as his family’s home. Another dissent (by a Greek 
judge) amplified this concern by pointing to the ethnic overtones. He wrote, “in any 
country, a national is entitled to have his son join him, even if the son does not have the 
same nationality. How does it come about that in the present case this right was refused 
him? I cannot think that it is because the Dutch father was called ‘Ahmut.’ However, the 
suspicion of discrimination must inevitably lurk in people's minds.” Indeed, a number of 
commentators have suggested that the decision was based on assumptions that Ahmut’s 
ethnicity joined his primary identity (and loyalty) to Morocco.18 
   The Şen case provides a striking contrast. The Court held that forcing the Şens either to 
abandon their lives in the Netherlands or not live with Sinem was too great an 
interference in family life for the perceived gain made in the state’s interest. Although the 
Netherlands had made a similar claim to that in the Ahmut case—that Sinem was not part 
of the family in the Netherlands but of her relative’s family in Turkey—the Court held 
that the decision of the Şens to first establish themselves in the Netherlands did not 
impair the familial bond with their daughter. The Court, however, distinguished the facts 
in Şen from Ahmut on the basis that the Şens had two more children after moving to the 
Netherlands and that these children had not known life in Turkey. 
   The Court’s efforts to distinguish the cases notwithstanding, the shift echoes the sense 
that the ECHR had shifted its jurisprudence, not only regarding immigrants’ choice of 
country of residence when deciding reunification cases, but also the weight of deference 
it gives to states. As Sarah van Walsum points out, the Netherlands made its decision in 
Şen to deny the request for the residence permit when only the first sibling had been born 
and was, at two-and-a-half years old, hardly entrenched in the Dutch school system or 
language.19 As such, the Court’s reliance on this fact to distinguish the cases was 
disingenuous. Furthermore, Salah Ahmut had, in some respects, factually stronger claims 
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than the Şens to a continuing connection to his child, given his record of financial support 
and visits. Ahmut’s guardianship status also changed after the death of his first wife. Mr. 
Ahmut’s status as a naturalized Dutch national also distinguished his position. Judge 
Martens’s dissent suggested that some might not like the way that Ahmut gained 
naturalized status (marrying and divorcing soon after naturalization), but noted that the 
government had not suggested that his status was in question.20 Similarly, the only other 
potential distinctions between the cases (the sex of the child and the difference between a 
biological mother and a step-mother) provided no legal basis to treat the cases differently. 
Accordingly, the Court appears to have moved toward giving greater weight to family 
interests in reunification cases, without making this change explicit. 
   The greater scrutiny of the European jurists can reverberate domestically in exceptional 
cases. The assertion of ethnic bias operating in national decision-making only points to 
the surface of a deep reservoir of political and cultural influences that works to frustrate a 
general or universal application of human rights jurisprudence. It can be difficult for the 
lawyers within the Dutch government to articulate what has transpired or what will 
happen in the future. The ECHR has a clear style, multiple interviewees concurred, but 
the doctrines governing the balance of regulations are more opaque. As represented by an 
interviewee, the advice given by government lawyers and other career civil servants to 
political decision-makers has its limits: 
 
When such issues are being discussed, we play our part; we steer, we give 
ideas, we warn, and we do so backed by the Convention in the first place 
and the Court’s case law in the second place, and to be very honest we 
don’t frequently get as far as using terms like ‘margin of appreciation’ 
because not all colleagues know what we’re talking about.  Sometimes I’m 
not sure what we’re talking about [laughter].   
 
   Going forward, the political winds can drive movements that may run up against the 
outer limits of the ECHR’s tolerances, but legal creativity remains a fundamental force in 
modulating the meaning of human rights. As surely as the Margin of Appreciation admits 
of vagueness, lawyers in the Dutch government evince the spirit of giving local trends 
their due. One interviewee suggested that the European trend toward laws banning the 
wearing of the burqa could find their way to the Netherlands. “If the politics dictates that 
we want to do something about that phenomenon, then that can be discussed as long as 
you use the proper arguments,” he argued. Freedom of Religion in Article 9, like Article 
8’s statement of competing values, allows for a state to advance arguments based on the 
prevention of crime and disorder, public safety, public order, or the rights of others. “You 
can make a case out of that,” he continued. What is the role of the lawyer as interpreter of 
the human rights law? It must serve politics:  
 
We could either say we are only there to say yes or no to a certain 
proposal, ‘this is unacceptable, you cannot do that,’ or is our job rather to 
help the policymakers to find the proper formulations? It is the latter. I 
could say it’s the first but then I would be corrected by higher instances. 
I’m not an academic, I’m a civil servant, and this is how it works, so we 
try to find the right formulations. And they can be found.   
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   The continuing tension between state and regional authorities is a battle joined by the 
ECHR.  The trajectory of the Court’s decisions in three other cases in which the 
Netherlands was found to have violated Article 8 shows a similar shift in giving greater 
weight to family rights and narrowing the state’s Margin of Appreciation. Beerhab v. The 
Netherlands21 was the first ECHR case to apply Article 8 to immigrants’ status. On 
January 31, 2006, the Court published its decisions in Rodrigues da Silva and 
Hoogkamer v. The Netherlands22 and Sezen v. The Netherlands.23 Each of the more recent 
cases found a violation in cases in which the applicants were in a less sympathetic 
position than in Beerhab. In other words, the state interest in the latter two cases appeared 
stronger than in Beerhab. Accordingly, the Court’s decisions finding a violation 
narrowed the Margin of Appreciation for national interests. 
   Beerhab presented the case of Abdellah Beerhab, who married a Netherlands national 
and was granted permanent residence and the right to work in the Netherlands for the 
purpose of the marriage. Following their divorce in 1979, and the birth one week later of 
their daughter Rebecca, Abdellah sought to renew his residence permit. He had been 
ordered to pay child support and had been granted frequent visitation to Rebecca, but he 
was denied a residence permit independent of his wife, and so was subsequently arrested 
and deported. The Court found complaint with the harsh approach, holding that Abdellah 
and Rebecca maintained a family life. Since there was legitimate family life during the 
initial marriage (the time of Rebecca’s conception), by extension there was family life 
between Rebecca and Abdellah. Interpreting paragraph 2 of Article 8, the Court could not 
view the deportation as a proportionate response to “a pressing social need,” even after 
making “allowance for the margin of appreciation that is left to the Contracting States” 
(para. 28). With a single dissent, the Court found the interference with family life too 
severe.  
   The facts in Rodrigues da Silva push the envelope further. The child in the case, Rachel 
Hoogkeimer, was born in 1996 to an unmarried couple. Rachel’s Brazilian mother, 
Solange Rodrigues da Silva, came to the Netherlands in 1994 with her Dutch partner 
Daniël Hoogkamer, but never applied for a residence permit and broke up with Daniël in 
1997. Daniël was given custody, though his former partner shared in the care. Rodirigues 
da Silva’s subsequent application for residence was rejected. The Dutch courts stated that 
Rachel either had to live in Brazil with her mother or in the Netherlands with her father. 
Although told to leave the Netherlands in 1999, Rodrigues da Silva stayed and continued 
to work (illegally) in the Netherlands, caring for Rachel on weekends. Unlike Beerhab, 
Rodrigues da Silva had never had legal, permanent residence status so the Court asked 
whether the Netherlands had a positive obligation to grant it, under which the State 
presumably has a wider Margin of Appreciation.24 
   The ECHR unanimously held that the Netherlands had violated Article 8. Since the 
Netherlands would not transfer parental authority to Rodrigues da Silva (its Child Care 
and Protection Board found that moving to Brazil would require a traumatic departure 
from the Netherlands for Rachel), the Court concluded that Rachel would remain in the 
Netherlands. As a result, expelling Rodrigues da Silva would break the bond between 
mother and daughter, which would disrupt both Rachel’s and Rodrigues da Silva’s family 
life, since the latter had been involved in Rachel’s care. Again the balancing 
predominates the Court’s analysis: “the Court considers that in the particular 
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circumstances of the case the economic well-being of the country does not outweigh the 
applicants' rights under Article 8, despite the fact that the first applicant was residing 
illegally in the Netherlands at the time of Rachael's birth. Indeed, by attaching such 
paramount importance to this latter element, the authorities may be considered to have 
indulged in excessive formalism” (para. 44). In this conclusion, while the Court continues 
to recognize the Netherlands’ interest in controlling immigration, it seems to suggest that 
this interest can only outweigh an individual’s family interest in cases of both de jure and 
de facto illegal immigration. Note that the Court’s weighting of parental interests in this 
case might reflect an uspoken preference for maintaining mother-child bonds rather than 
father-child bonds, although one would not expect the Court to explicitly state it. 
   The third case in the trio, Sezen, adds the element of a criminal conviction to the 
recurring pattern of a couple that separated after having a child—thus striking at the heart 
of the contemporary political panic over the purported connection between ethnically 
diverse immigration and public safety. Mevlut Sezen married another Turkish national 
(Emine Sezen-Oğuz) who had permanent residence in the Netherlands, where she had 
lived since she was seven years old. After their marriage, he was granted a residence 
permit and, one year later, given the right to remain in the Netherlands indefinitely. 
Shortly thereafter he was arrested and convicted of possession of over 50 kg of heroin, 
with intent to distribute. After his release from more than two years in custody, the 
couple lived in separate apartments, although they conceived a second child during this 
time. The Ministry of Justice sought to withdraw Mevlut’s residence permit and impose a 
10-year exclusion order against him (barring entry to the country for even short visits); 
the Netherlands had a sliding scale policy that took into account the length of time one 
had been in the country legally and the severity of the crime. In applying Article 8, the 
Dutch authorities argued that the Sezens’ familial interest should not be given much 
weight, concluding that there had been a permanent breakdown of the marriage since the 
couple no longer was cohabitating. The Dutch courts quashed the exclusion order, but 
upheld the decision to not extend the residence permit. 
   Again, the European Court of Human Rights, on a 5-2 decision, held that the 
Netherlands had not struck a fair balance between the interests of the Sezen family and 
the interests of society. All parties admitted that the withdrawal of the residence permit 
interfered with family life, but in assessing whether the action was “justified by a 
pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate to the aim pursued” (para. 41), the 
Court drew particular attention to the fact that the family was still a functioning unit, the 
temporary living arrangements notwithstanding. The Netherlands had not given sufficient 
attention to the effects on family life.25 The Court concluded that the interference in 
family life was quite severe and not proportionate to the protection of public safety.26 The 
dissenting opinion, written by the ECHR’s Dutch judge, argued that the Netherlands had 
not been unreasonable or arbitrary under its sliding scale policy. Without using the term 
Margin of Appreciation, the dissent vitally drew attention to the balance between nation-
states and the human rights regime implemented by Court.   
 
[T]he conflicting arguments are more or less in balance and a decision in 
either direction is arguable. In these circumstances, it seems to me that it 
should be left to the national authorities to balance the interests involved. 
Since the applicants’ interests have not been overlooked and reasonable 
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and foreseeable legal principles were applied, I believe that the majority 
should have shown more restraint. Their conclusion sets aside the 
balancing exercise carried out by the national authorities without, 
however, giving a clear message capable of contributing to a fair national 
immigration policy (para. 8).  
 
   Because Sezen concerned a negative obligation to not remove the residence permit of 
one already in the country, the state would typically have had a narrower Margin of 
Appreciation (indeed, the term does not appear at all in the publication of the Court’s 
opinion or the dissent). On the other hand, the case involves an additional public interest, 
namely public safety, that the Court and Dutch authorities consider in applying Article 8. 
While in Beerhab the Court made explicit reference to the fact that Beerhab had not 
committed any crime and was therefore more deserving of a residence permit despite the 
harm to the economy by having a non-national take a job, in Sezen the state’s interest in 
the economy did not figure at all (and Mevlut Sezen’s status in gainful employment was 
perhaps implicitly taken to mean that he was less a public safety threat). In this sense, the 
flexibility of the Court’s doctrinal balancing appears dramatic, and the scope for the 
Strasbourg culture to do its work appears wide. 
   Some of that culture finds agreement within the Netherlands. Within multiple 
ministries, the tension in 2010 about the direction of Dutch politics made it apparent that 
human rights law is not seen by the actors themselves as entirely organic. The Court’s 
legitimacy within the legal community has a much stronger foundation, such that 
criticisms of particular decisions aside, the legal community in the Netherlands 
entertained no doubt about the relevance of ECHR decisions to Dutch law. The prospect 
of the influence of Wilders over the work within the government ministries—merely 
hypothetical at the time of our interviews—brought the suggestion that there were limits 
to how far lawyers could go in creating arguments for the Court or in resisting 
implementation of its decrees. Viewing human rights law as taking on a concrete form, 
one government lawyer we interviewed added that the arguments the Court considers are 
not “autonomous” but based in evolving precedent. 
   Even so, a final case for discussion here, Üner v. The Netherlands,27 cautions observers 
and cause lawyers to appreciate the effect of political context. Üner came to the 
Netherlands at age 12 with his family to be reunited with his father, who had been in the 
country for ten years. After six years, he was granted a permanent residence permit in 
1988. In the next two years he was convicted of breaching the peace and of a violent 
offense against a person in public. A relationship with a Dutch national, begun in 1991, 
produced a son in early 1992. He later moved out of the house shared with his partner and 
son, and further criminal incidents culminated in a manslaughter conviction for the death 
of a man he shot in the head in a fight. His partner and son visited Üner in prison 
regularly; Üner and his partner conceived a second child while he was imprisoned. In 
1997, the Ministry of Justice withdrew Üner’s permanent residence status and issued a 
ten-year exclusion order on him, arguing that the interest in public safety outweighed 
Üner’s interest in family life. After his release from prison in 1998, the Netherlands 
deported him, doing so a second time when he returned illegally. In March 2006, 
Netherlands authorities found Üner working at an illegal cannabis plantation (giving new 
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meaning to Üner’s claim that he had turned over a new leaf) and again deported him to 
Turkey. 
   The Üner case was decided by a Grand Chamber after a panel of the court initially 
ruled in favor of the Netherlands. In the first Article 8 case heard in Grand Chamber, the 
Court ruled in a 14-3 decision that the deportation and exclusion of a Turkish national did 
not violate the Convention. Here was the law confronting the new demographic realities 
of Europe and facing a significant question: whether, and under what circumstances, 
governments could deport long-term or second-generation immigrants. The government 
of the Netherlands argued that if the Court held “that the expulsion of aliens belonging to 
the category of second-generation or long-term immigrants was always disproportionate 
and discriminatory … [it] would entirely eliminate the margin of appreciation enjoyed by 
the State when assessing individual immigration cases” (para 48). In addition, the 
government of Germany submitted an intervention, arguing in favor of allowing 
exclusion orders and not limiting the amount of time that countries could exclude 
deported people from the country. 
   The Court’s decision in favor of the Netherlands noted that there was no absolute right 
against expulsion. While acknowledging that some states forbid expulsion of long-term 
immigrants on the basis of criminal records and that while the Council of Europe’s 
Parliamentary Assembly had recommended limited expulsion as a criminal sanction only 
to offenses affecting state security (and forbidding it entirely in cases in which the 
individual was born or raised in the host country), the Court noted that the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe had retained an earlier policy that allowed for 
expulsion based on the severity of the offense and the amount of time one had been 
residing in the country. Further, the Court held that Article 8 could not be construed as to 
forbid expulsion, since the second paragraph of the Article suggests that states may 
interfere with family life if it is in accordance with law and necessary for a variety of 
purposes. In the particular case, the Court found that the deportation and exclusion were 
proportionate since Üner had a history of criminal violence and since the family bonds 
could adapt either to life in Turkey or to Üner’s absence. In its decision, the Court did not 
make direct reference to the Margin of Appreciation. While its analysis drawing on the 
second paragraph of Article 8 suggests some incorporation of Margin-of-Appreciation-
based ideas, its other analysis (drawing on Council of Europe advice that argued for a 
sliding-scale-type policy) does not provide clear guidance as to whether the Court 
considers the decision based on the Margin of Appreciation applied to the state, 
particularly since it based the decision on the seriousness of Üner’s offenses. 
   The dissent recognized that the family ties between Üner, his partner, and his children 
were strong enough to survive his imprisonment, and that his partner and children had no 
connection to Turkey. Further, the dissent disagreed with the weighing of factors, 
needing to discount the seriousness of the offense with the length of Üner’s time in the 
Netherlands, the duration of his relationship with his partner, the well-being of Üner’s 
children, the hardship Üner’s partner and children would face if uprooted to Turkey, and 
the length of time that had passed since Üner’s violent offenses. In a sense, too, 
deportation and exclusion appeared to the dissent to be more severe than imprisonment, 
which at least offered some window for family life. 
   Civil servants within the Netherlands are clearly cognizant, to quote one interviewee, of 
the “nationalism and xenophobia” that threatens the continued growth of the legitimacy 
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of the ECHR, but the Üner decision speaks to the two-way process of legal development. 
The ECHR’s vision does not stand independently and universally in opposition to 
national level interests. The nation-state remains vital in a globalizing world. So 
important to the outcome in this case—an outcome that runs against the grain of Article 8 
family reunification cases generally—is the one most stinging fact of this case: the death 
by shooting at the hands of Üner. Each factor other than the seriousness of offense argued 
in Üner’s favor, but the severity and history of the crime made him an unsympathetic 
defendant. The law of human rights is not a fixed entity but a work in creation. The 
choices made by lawyers in the cases they bring and the mood and context of a changing 
Europe will shape the potential and limits of the law. For a body that stakes its claim as 
the authoritative interpreter of human rights in Europe, the unavoidable conclusion is that 
human rights is a measure of what is rather than what one might wish it to be.  
 
V.  Regulating Human Rights in the Netherlands 
 
The problem described in the preceding section is the conundrum of constitutional 
jurisprudence in many systems. Some rights are more easily described as fundamental; 
others are qualified rights. The right to family reunification is a key concept in the 
application of Article 8 and “that guarantee now plays a major role in national 
immigration law throughout Europe.”28 Yet, policing the boundaries of a right that must 
be balanced against other important values becomes a sensitive political situation for the 
Court. Its authority does not derive from a natural law commandment for human rights. 
In light of changing social situations, the political feedback from aggressive expansion of 
the family reunification value could be pronounced. If the Court voluntarily withdrew 
from this front, it could placate local officials, building support for the Court and 
avoiding damaging conflicts, but at the expense of its perceived moral authority and its 
duty to do justice. 
   If these considerations come down, at some level, to political strategy and the choices 
judges and national officials will make about what meaning they will give to the law, 
then it is a political dialogue that occurs within a longer timeline. For a constitutional 
order founded less than a century ago—and one founded in the rubble of the continent—
the ECHR has demonstrated staying power and more. It has been credited with 
influencing national decision-making across a wide range of policy areas, not merely 
those with a particular “judicial” tinge (such as criminal process rights). The law of 
Article 8 is a case in point. The Court consistently pushed countries, including the 
Netherlands, toward greater respect for the maintenance and reunification of families. 
National authorities have, to date, been willing to accept the judgments of the ECHR in 
this area, even though it touches on highly salient and controversial areas of public 
policy, especially immigration and racial/ethnic diversity. 
   The significant distance the ECHR has traveled during its relatively short evolution is 
reflected in the terms and points of reference within legal dialogue. For the Dutch 
lawyers interviewed in this project, the role of precedent took on a special character. 
Precedent matters to lawyers as much in continental Europe as in the common law 
systems of the Anglo-American tradition. Precedent plays a major role in how lawyers 
work through the arguments and define what is possible as they go to Court. It is also 
how nation-states decide what must be done in similar cases. But discussion of ECHR 
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precedent with Dutch lawyers is a qualitatively different experience than discussions in 
the Anglo-American world. An important reason has to do with the rapidity with which 
the law appears to have evolved. Precedent more than ten years old, our interviewees 
reported, is rarely relevant. In the United States today, political contestation occurs 
around decisions—such as Roe v. Wade or Mapp v. Ohio (the Exclusionary Rule)—that 
ushered in a doctrinal approach that remains contested. Even decades later, these classic 
decisions still set the terms for discussion. In Europe, the backlash has not occurred thus 
far, and so the ECHR’s evolving direction remains the dominant frame; old decisions do 
not continue to set the terms. Past may be prologue, but in the United States the book 
keeps repeating itself. Europe has left behind precedents that no longer appear relevant. 
   Geography figures into the weakness of precedent and the past for Europe’s human 
rights future. Decisions from other European countries are only weak precedent across 
the borders. The reasons for this are not the formalities of jurisdiction, as it is when a 
lawyer of one American state asks whether a case from another state is relevant. The 
differences remain lodged in a Europe that is changing quickly but also moving slowly 
toward integration. The particularities of the Netherlands—its culture, institutions, 
history—are so distinct that Dutch lawyers look at precedents from other countries as 
interesting (serving as an indicator of how judges of the ECHR are approaching a subject) 
but not determinative. The decisions in Article 8 cases, triggering consideration of factors 
like public safety, remain embedded in a social context that does not yet see more of the 
universal than the local. Local values matter, and human rights doctrine only serves to 
capture the balance that must be rendered. That state of affairs is ironic, then, because the 
rapidly changing scene for European human rights law undermines the value of old 
precedent but has not resulted in a sufficient convergence of conditions for more nations 
to see their positions (reflected in precedents) as identical. 
   The Dutch government may be among the most ready to look upon the decisions given 
to other nations by the ECHR as a stimulus toward reform. It has been generally credited 
with amending “legislation where this is required by decisions of the ECHR, whether 
rendered against the Netherlands or against other Contracting States.”29 Yet human rights 
advocates in the Netherlands find reason to be critical, believing the commitment of the 
government to be only superficial or secondary, a distant concern that undercuts the value 
of human rights. That thought is echoed in the caveat, “worth noting, however, that it 
may take several years for legislative amendments to go through the Parliamentary 
process, during which time the Netherlands could be confronted with several 
determinations of violations of the CHR that are all similar to the one prompting the 
legislative change in the first place.”30 
   If one wants to understand the pitfalls of human rights as a vehicle for improving the 
human condition, the example of Yugoslavia or Rwanda or many other sites of human 
rights abuses might come to mind. A global society that said “Never again!” has borne 
witness to human rights tragedies with disappointing frequency. But the nature and limits 
of human rights are arguably better tested in the experience of a country like the 
Netherlands, a case of the “green wood rather than the dry.” For a global society, with 
states as its most prominent actors, to nevertheless begin a slow process of codifying the 
claims of people against national governments would require a bulwark of support. How 
states and nationally organized populations respond to supranational rights institutions 
provides insights into the limits and possibilities of that transformation. Since European 
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governments, in general, and the Netherlands, in particular, have been at the forefront of 
the universalizing rights movement, we have examined the relative status of the 
Netherlands and the European Court of Human Rights, a particularly important institution 
that hears claims of individuals against governments. As Stone Sweet and Keller have 
written so emphatically, “The European Convention on Human Rights is the most 
effective human rights regime in the world.”31 
   As our analysis of the jurisprudence of Articles 3 and 8 shows, a sense of progressive 
movement away from popular sovereignty and toward legal governance characterizes the 
broad historical sweep of the paired relationship between the ECHR and the Dutch 
government. The activism of the European Court of Human Rights “has helped to propel 
the system forward,”32 and appropriately so, in the words of one Dutch attorney, because 
“the guarantees in the Convention would become very meaningless if [the ECHR judges] 
did not take an active approach.” In an interview painted with a brush plainly too broad 
but illustrative of the contemporary confidence in the Court, a Dutch civil servant 
claimed, “if there is one constitution of Europe, it is the European Convention on Human 
Rights. It is effectively the most authoritative court…Everybody will follow it. If you 
look at the literature, a lot of criticisms are voiced, but in the end everybody will do as the 
Court says.”  
   The evolving jurisprudence of the ECHR has pushed frequently against European 
governments in an effort to expand the effective meaning of the Convention’s 
protections. Such movement, however, is made possible by the willingness of countries 
like the Netherlands to follow the Court’s lead and comply with its dictates. The meaning 
of human rights has a textual foundation but what can be done with that text—the 
potential for judicial activism—depends on other factors in its social and political 
context. Two generations of scholars now deem it beyond question that the work of 
courts is “political,” at least insofar as decisions are located within an environment that 
structures the choices available to the judges and makes the choices dependent on the 
anticipation of the behavior of other actors. Law is simply not autonomous from 
politics.33 The civil servant who expressed such confidence in the ECHR somewhat 
paradoxically observed that the Court is one actor among many. “It can be very often,” he 
observed, that “the political wind here in The Hague is such that a Court decision is not 
exactly welcome. So what happens is that you look at ways of dealing with it, sparing the 
political sentiment. There are a lot of difficult situations where you just have to find a 
solution that will satisfy everybody, which is sometimes impossible.” 
   In the European context, the history of doctrines like the Margin of Appreciation 
confirms this essential point. As one interviewee repeated, almost as a maxim, the aim of 
that “wonderful device,” the Margin of Appreciation doctrine, “is not to protect human 
rights but to protect the Court.” The Court has doctrines (i.e., Margin of Appreciation and 
Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies) that have enabled states to retain a good deal of 
authority in relation to the scope of its decisions, affording the Court legitimacy. Over 
time, the narrowing margin and ECHR’s more assertive review have evidenced a 
growing tendency of the Court to regulate states. 
   In their interdependent relationship with nation-states, the institutions of human rights 
receive support from conditions in the Netherlands that allow their expansion. In recent 
years, scholars have argued persuasively that the expansion of rights and healthy 
constitutional systems stem from the acumen of the lawyers and interest groups that drive 
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issues to resolution and frame the questions for courts.34 In the Netherlands, the number 
of attorneys who push cases to the ECHR is relatively limited; specialization further 
divides their number across types of cases (e.g., criminal versus civil). That portion of the 
bar expert in ECHR practice has expanded, such that referrals to the leading attorneys can 
provide a substantial practice—a form of specialization that has important consequences 
for the skill with which cases are brought to the ECHR and the likelihood of success. As 
attorneys gain experience litigating before the ECHR, they develop the ability to be 
selective with cases. In other words, they are now willing and able to refuse cases that 
have no (or only an “academic”) hope of success. In this respect, the attorneys may help 
to expand the Court’s authority incrementally, as Salah Sheekh demonstrates. The 
decision to file a grievance with the ECHR and forego an appeal to the Radd van Staat 
case came about due to the advice of Salah Sheekh’s attorney (who also successfully 
argued the case in Strasbourg). The selection of the case and the timing of the filing with 
the ECHR relied on deep knowledge of the Strasbourg culture. The framing of the 
argument provided judges with the raw material that argued that the outcome in the case 
really did not repudiate the principle of Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies despite the 
fact that the decision reduced the formalism of the requirement. Forty-six of the forty-
seven judges of the ECHR are appointed from countries other than the Netherlands. An 
attorney making an application is in a position to teach many judges of the ways of the 
country at hand, and sometimes, one attorney said, offer a “Teletubby” legal argument to 
instruct a judge in the lessons of the Court’s own voluminous precedent. Though to be 
taken with a grain of salt, this lawyer’s confidence allowed him to suggest that even “the 
civil servants who litigate against you are not used to a big ECHR approach” to a case. 
The “repeat player” here may be the human rights advocates, helping to drive forward 
that agenda, particularly since they can serve as the bridge between the domestic context 
of government practice and international network or rights principles. 
   Equally important in forming a successful environment for human rights in the 
Netherlands is the strong provision of legal aid to attorneys who represent clients to the 
ECHR. Financial support is uneven across Europe. Some leading cases, including cases 
from human rights laggards such as Russia and Turkey, have been brought to the ECHR 
through the involvement of international organizations like Amnesty International. The 
structure of support in Western Europe varies. One Dutch attorney looked at English 
lawyers with a somewhat self-interested and dismissive posture. “What I’ve learned from 
the U.K.,” he observed, “is that you make your money as a lawyer with the national cases 
and, they think, you ought to do the ECHR out of sheer altruism—I think that’s 
ridiculous. It’s hard work and I don’t see why that shouldn’t be rewarded with some kind 
of financial support.” Critical as this lawyer may be, the altruism of the English example 
evidences a bar that is professionally supportive of human rights litigation. A contrast 
with the United States’ experience with legal aid shines a favorable light on this 
attorney’s ability to gloat in financial success. The conservative backlash of the 1970s 
and 1980s in the United States targeted what was seen as an utter lack of common sense: 
state funding so that lawyers could sue the state (and cost the state money). The Dutch 
case, though different from the English, gives evidence of a state that tolerates or even 
supports the work of its critics.  
   Notwithstanding the contributions of the Dutch government toward a meaningful 
system of human rights implementation, the experience at the cutting edge of human 
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rights work says as much about the nature of global citizenship as the outright failures 
and achievements in more extreme cases of human rights abuses. At the cutting edge, 
settlement, an important dynamic of law everywhere, has a particular impact. The 
empirical study of the ECHR is too new an enterprise to have fleshed out the rates of 
settlement in human rights litigation, but with voluminous caseloads, an agreement of the 
parties out of court terminates a substantial portion of the work. In the abstract, some 
parties settle knowing they possess a weak case; sometimes they settle from mutual 
uncertainty about the outcome. Whatever the reasons, settlement provides a vehicle by 
which a state can avoid a more substantial revision of the laws. One private attorney, 
critical of the Dutch ministries, recounted a suit by a traumatized asylum seeker: 
 
[It was a] very nice case, beautifully presented, so I was really looking 
forward to it, but then I got a phone call by my counterpart at the Ministry 
of Justice saying, ‘look, we would like to invite your client to ask for 
asylum again.’ I was legally heartbroken, but what arrogance would I have 
to withhold that from my client? On the other hand, you want this 
ridiculous law to be changed.   
 
   Cause lawyers around the world have faced the same ethical conflict: how to win relief 
for the greatest number, when they are obliged to give their client the best possible 
individual remedy.35 That answer is, mostly, clear. But the wider impact, noted this 
attorney, is that “the law is still in force today,” resulting in the unfortunate return of 
asylum seekers who happen to fall afoul of its terms. 
   Settlement, then, burdens the potential success of a human rights regime by allowing 
parties to seek out minimalist responses to conditions on the ground that are in need of 
change. In the context of changing public opinions—what one interviewee called the 
Netherlands’ “increasingly narcissistic approach” to foreigners—the legal frame of 
human rights makes settlement a vehicle for negotiating the impact of the Convention’s 
aspirations with the political context of the day. For legal insiders who know the 
precedents and the tenor of the ECHR, it is possible to identify several statutes that have 
been enforced even in the knowledge that they are not “Strasbourg proof”—able to 
withstand challenge should a suit reach a final decision by the Court at some point years 
ahead. 
   These relationships at the boundaries of human rights law reveal the political limits of 
Dutch policymaking. How far has the Netherlands transformed its laws (much less 
society) in the wake of European human rights decisions? The question strikes at the 
heart of the Dutch self-conception as a progressive leader in the field. The reception of 
the Salah Sheekh decision provides a case in point, because the approach of the ECHR—
in giving up on the possibility of finding an effective remedy in the Dutch Council 
d’Etat—created an affront, becoming the repeated focus of parliamentary discussions and 
debates, along with notable media attention.36 The policy was changed, and when it 
unavoidably must change—some rules being exactingly technical—the government 
changes “quite quickly.” But the changes can be characterized as minimalist, narrowly 
finding an acceptable solution without a prolonged search to root out the underlying 
problems. That assessment, suggested in our interviews, finds support in academic 
appraisals.37 
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   Financial considerations, while never the explicit pragmatic argument offered to the 
ECHR, further constrain the government’s approach. Politics and society interweave in 
this analysis. A number of interviewees spoke of the “arrogance” of the Netherlands, the 
felt assumption that its efforts were either sufficient or beyond reproach, a mindset that 
produces no agenda for self-criticism or call for wholesale reform. Institutionally, the 
structure of the Dutch Constitution and the absence of a constitutional court (akin to 
France and vis-à-vis Germany), makes it difficult to effect broader change, since 
individual courts must follow developments in ECHR law rather than allowing a 
constitutional court to take the lead in incorporating these developments. Matters of 
economics constrain the Netherlands as they constrain every country. 
   Human rights decisions are altering the course of events in national law, particularly 
due to the increasing sophistication of litigation by well-networked lawyers and 
organizations able to use the ECHR as a vehicle for legal policymaking. However, the 
process of fully integrating a human rights culture in government remains elusive. An 
interviewee in a Dutch ministry commented critically on the slow socialization of 
legislative policymaking into the ways of Europe. He offered an example of recent 
legislation in matters of particular types of immigration, finding it typical of a wider 
process: “If you look at new legislation in Holland it is rarely in sync with European 
legislation. Rarely…Basically [the new law], it’s national legislation. What we very often 
do is first we write the law and then we look whether it fits in.” Even more critically, but 
with a tinge of optimism, he added, “we’ve been able to fool ourselves into believing that 
Holland was still a sovereign country and that Europe was basically a periphery 
somewhere… Politics here is slowly changing now…It has been slowly sinking in that 
Europe is important.” 
   Here, then, lie the social and political manifestations of resistance to human rights law 
as a force with universalizing potential. The Netherlands has a number of positive forces, 
especially in support for, and availability of, legal representation able to bring the ECHR 
to bear on matters of Dutch law. The civil service is largely supportive, and right-wing 
politics has made a mark on Holland but has failed to wrest political control from parties 
that have historically reflected a consensus position of openness and toleration. As 
interviewees rushed to point out, society has changed dramatically in the Netherlands yet 
the worst incidents of xenophobia and social unrest in Europe—citing the mass rioting in 
France—have not been replicated there. However, “universal” human rights do not occur 
far away but in local and national decisions, and the imprint is indirect and imprecise. As 
a form of law, human rights fall into a pattern well observed in other areas of the law. As 
seen in the Dutch case, it is a matter of compliance and regulation, laden with a political 
economy of decision-making. The game of cat-and-mouse that defines human rights law 
and practice converges around these factors, against which the law is tempted into 
formalism as a reply. Minimal compliance, or creative ways of avoiding compliance, 
remains very much part of the politics of law, and the aspiration is buried in the 
mechanics of regulation through law. 
   Human rights—their meaning and power—remain in play, even in the favorable setting 
of the Netherlands. The recent cautionary words of a Dutch commentator serves notice: 
“In the wake of the sometimes reactionary responses by Governments and their resulting 
inroads in the civil liberties of individuals, it becomes clear that the rights and obligations  
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guaranteed by the ECHR remain vulnerable, despite the progress made over the last 60 
years.”38 Human rights and the quest for global citizenship, both fixed in a world of 
nation-states, remain contingent upon national politics. 
 
Notes 
 
1. T. H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship, and Social Development (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday, 1963); and Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990–
1992 (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992).  
 
2. Yasemin Soysal, “Citizenship and Identity: Living in Diasporas in Post-War Europe?,” 
Ethnic and Racial Studies 23 (2000): 1–15. 
 
3.  John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramierez, “World 
Society and the Nation-State,” American Journal of Sociology 103 (1997): 144–181. 
 
4.  Simon Halliday and Patrick Schmidt, eds., Human Rights Brought Home: Socio-Legal 
Perspectives on Human Rights in the National Context (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004). 
 
5. Erik Larson, Zachary Johnson, and Monique Murphy. “Emerging Indigenous 
Governance: Ainu Rights at the Intersection of Global Norms and Domestic Institutions,” 
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 33 (2008): 53–82. 
 
6.  As noted by Marlies Glasius, these international criminal bodies are not human rights 
institutions because they are not venues in which individuals pursue grievance-based 
claims against states. 
 
7. Rachel A. Cichowski, The European Court and Civil Society: Litigation, Mobilization, 
and Governance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
 
8.  Or under relinquishment, if the Chamber to which a case is assigned determines a case 
involves either interpretation of the Convention or risks inconsistency in Court 
judgments. 
 
9.  Alec Stone Sweet and Helen Keller, “The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal 
Orders,” in A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems, 
edited by Keller and Stone Sweet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 25. 
 
10. Erika de Wet, “The Reception Process in the Netherlands and Belgium,” in Ibid., pp. 
254–55. 
 
11. Case of Salah Sheekh v. The Netherlands, ECHR Third Section, 11 January 2007, 
application nr. 1948/04. All cases were retrieved electronically from the ECHR’s 
HUDOC system. 
 
194 
 
12. The decision of the Court, however, has not prevented analogous situations 
concerning other refugee seekers from Somalia facing similar issues. See, for example, 
Marijke Peters, “Dutch Deportation of Somalis ‘A Death Sentence,’” Radio Netherlands 
Worldwide (22 July 2010), accessed online at rnw.nl/english/article/dutch-deportation-
somalis-a-death-sentence.  
 
13. Keller and Stone Sweet 2008, “Assessing the Impact of the ECHR on National Legal 
Systems,” p. 702. 
 
14. De Wet in Ibid., p. 267. 
 
15. Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken (ACVZ; Advisory Committee on 
Migration Affairs), Tegen de Wil Achtergebleven: Een Advies over in Herkomstlanden 
Achtergelaten Vrouwen en Kinderen (Den Haag: ACVZ, 2005). 
 
16. Case of Ahmut v. The Netherlands, ECHR Chamber Court, 28 November 1996, 
application nr. 21702/93. 
 
17. Affaire Şen v. Pays-Bas, ECHR First Section, 21 December 2001, application nr. 
31465/96. 
 
18. See, for example, Elspeth Guild, The Legal Elements of European Identity: EU 
Citizenship and Migration Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004).  She 
argues that the Court’s decision in Ahmut relates to ethnicity, since it relies on the idea 
that Ahmut’s ethnicity means his primary identity was with Morocco. See also, 
Jacqueline Bhabha, “Enforcing the Rights of Citizens and Non-Citizens in the Era of 
Maastricht: Some Reflections on the Importance of States,” in Globalization and Identity: 
Dialectics of Flow and Closure, edited by Birgit Meyer and Peter Geschiere (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2003 [1999]), pp. 97-124. Bhabha argues that the Ahmut decision was based 
on ethnic assumptions and that a wide Margin of Appreciation enables states to keep 
unequal practices intact, but also makes states particularly important sites for 
implementation, since the rights in the courts offer somewhat an opening of space for 
claims. 
 
19. Sarah van Walsum, “Comment on the Sen Case. How Wide is the Margin of 
Appreciation Regarding the Admission of Children for Purposes of Family 
Reunification?,” European Journal of Migration and Law 4 (2003): 518. 
 
20. “Admittedly, one might be tempted to doubt whether he has acquired that status by 
means which are above suspicion. However, since the Government have not relied on this 
feature of the case and have accepted that Salah Ahmut is a Netherlands national, the 
principle of equality requires that the Court apply the same standards as it would apply to 
those whose Netherlands nationality is irreproachable” (para 6). 
 
21. Case of Beerhab v. The Netherlands, ECHR Chamber Court, 21 June 1988, 
application nr. 10730/84. 
195 
 
 
22. Case of Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. The Netherlands, ECHR Former 
Section II, 31 January 2006, application nr. 50435/99. 
 
23. Case of Sezen v. The Netherlands, ECHR Former Section II, 31 January 2006, 
application nr. 50252/99. 
 
24. The Court did not make a distinction between the positive and negative obligation in 
Beerhab. It did, however, note that, “the instant case did not concern an alien seeking 
admission to the Netherlands for the first time but a person who had already lawfully 
lived there for several years, who had a home and a job there, and against whom the 
Government did not claim to have any complaint” (para 29). This framing reflects a point 
that the Court made in Ahmut: the line between positive and negative obligations is 
imprecise. The key point, however, is that in a case in which the Court does clearly 
distinguish that it is a positive obligation (as it did in paragraph  
38 in Rodrigues da Silva), one would anticipate a wider Margin of Appreciation than in 
cases in which the nature of the obligation is less clear. 
 
25. The decision was grounded by criteria set out in the ECHR’s 2001 decision in Boultif 
v. Switzerland. The criteria are:  
• the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant; 
• the length of the applicant’s stay in the country from which he or she is to be 
expelled; 
• the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the applicant’s conduct during 
that period; 
• the nationalities of the various persons concerned; 
• the applicant’s family situation, such as the length of the marriage, and other factors 
expressing the effectiveness of a couple’s family life; 
• whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he or she entered into a 
family relationship; 
• whether there are children of the marriage, and if so, their age; and 
• the seriousness of the difficulties that the spouse is likely to encounter in the 
applicant’s country of origin.  
(Summary quoted from para. 42 of Sezen). 
 
26. While not explicitly addressed by the Court in its analysis, its decision that the 
response was disproportionate may also reflect the fact that Mevlut had not reoffended 
and had secured paid employment since his early release from custody (para 21). 
 
27. Case of Üner v. The Netherlands, ECHR Grand Chamber, 18 October 2006, 
application nr. 46410/99. 
 
28. Keller and Stone Sweet 2008, p. 699. 
 
29. Erika de Wet in Ibid., pp. 275–76. 
 
196 
 
30. Ibid. 
 
31. Ibid., p. 3. 
 
32. Ibid. 
 
33. For a recent review and appraisal, see Christopher Tomlins, “How Autonomous Is 
Law?,” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 3 (December 2007): 45–68. 
 
34. See, e.g., Charles Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme 
Courts in Comparative Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); and 
Mikael Rask Madsen, “From Cold War Instrument to Supreme European Court: The 
European Court of Human Rights at the Crossroads of International and National Law 
and Politics,” Law and Social Inquiry 32, no. 1 (2007)): 137–159. 
 
35. Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, eds., Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments 
and Professional Responsibilities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
 
36. Dominique van Dam, Who’s Right(s): International Monitoring of Compliance with 
Human Rights of Migrants in the Netherlands, 2000–2008 (Nijmegen: Centre for 
Migration Law/Forum Institute for Multicultural Affairs, 2009), pp. 97–99. 
 
37. De Wet in Keller and Stone Sweet 2008. “[O]ne can conclude that the Dutch 
Government is in principle committed to bringing its legislation into line with the 
jurisprudence of the ECHR. However, closer scrutiny reveals that the commitment of the 
Government is on occasion tainted by a minimalist interpretation of the rights in the 
ECHR and several years of delay in implementing the necessary legislation” (276). 
 
38. Ibid., p. 306. 
